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Abstract:  
In this article I argue that Ernst Bloch was profoundly correct to identify a 
materialist philosophical tendency that runs from Aristotle, through 
Averrroes and Spinoza, to Marx. Recognizing this "Left Aristotelian" 
current allows us to see the influence of Aristotle's conception of 
happiness as eudaimonia or human "flourishing" on Averroes's and 
Spinoza's use of the term "beatitude." It also enables us better to 
understand what the early Marx means by "real happiness" and how the 
mature Marx in Capital conceives of a post-capitalist society based on 
the "association of free men." Finally, we can appreciate the importance 
of an Aristotelian account of "flourishing" for defending an ecosocialist 
position on sustainability. 
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It has recently become commonplace to argue that both Spinoza and 
Marx should be appreciated philosophically as Epicureans, indeed, as 
key figures in a subterranean current of “aleatory materialism.”2 Although 
there is much to be said in favor of such an interpretation, I believe it is 
one sided. Consequently, in this article I seek to show that an equally 
important conceptual influence on both Spinoza and Marx was neither 
Epicurus nor Lucretius but Aristotle, in particular with respect to what 
Aristotle called eudaimonia, Spinoza called beatitudo, and Marx called 
“real” – as opposed to “illusory” – happiness. I hope to supplement efforts 
by others to chart the “Aristotelian lineage of Marx’s eudaimonism.”3 By 
reclaiming the normative materialist current that links Aristotle to 
Averroes to Spinoza to Marx, we can more effectively criticize capitalism, 
refashion a credible model of ecological sustainability, and make good 
on the Marxist promise of human emancipation. Let us begin with Marx, 
and then retrace our steps. 
 In 1843 Karl Marx famously wrote that “the abolition of religion as 
the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real 
happiness (Die Aufhebung der Religion als des illusorischen Glücks des 
Volkes ist die Forderung seines wirklichen Glücks)”4 In this single line 
Marx makes a twofold distinction. Firstly, he explicitly distinguishes 
between an imaginary resolution of human social ills through religious, 
or some other, ideology and the actual social-political transformation 
required in order to reduce human suffering to the greatest possible 
extent. This is why Marx envisions the Aufhebung of religion. This does 
not mean the “abolition” of religion in the sense of its “elimination” but of 
its “supersession,” that is to say, the incorporation of what has been 
historically valuable, but inadequate, about religion. Hence, we find Marx 
using the adjective wirklichen to characterize the “happiness” (Glück) for 
which there has arisen a “demand” (Forderung). The connotation of 
wirklichen here is not “real” as opposed to “unreal” but “effective” as 
opposed to “ineffective” means to bring about happiness. Secondly, 
though, Marx implicitly distinguishes between happiness conceived of as 
subjective pleasure, contentment, or fulfilment and happiness as an 
objective, all-around human flourishing. In this respect, as we shall see, 
Marx should be regarded as a theoretical ally of Aristotle.5 Indeed, as 
Terry Eagleton has succinctly written, Marx  
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belonged to the great Aristotelian tradition for which morality was 
not primarily a question of laws, obligations, codes and 
prohibitions, but a question of how to live in the freest, fullest, most 
self-fulfilling way. Morality for Marx was in the end all about 
enjoying yourself. But since nobody can live their lives in isolation, 
ethics had to involve politics as well. Aristotle thought just the 
same.6 
 
Let us turn, then, briefly to consider Aristotle’s ethics. 
 Aristotle begins and ends his Nicomachean Ethics by trying to 
understand the nature of eudaimonia.7 This widely used term in ancient 
Greek thought is best translated in Aristotle’s writings not as “happiness” 
but as “flourishing,” for it concerns not subjective pleasure as “ordinary 
people, the most vulgar ones, suppose”8 but instead the embodiment and 
realization of an objective sense of life going as well as possible. By 
eudaimonia Aristotle seeks to identify the highest and most worthy life: 
for human beings, it is one grounded in rational activity. Of course, he 
does not claim that each of us should, or even could, experience 
precisely the same form of eudaimonia. What enables me to flourish 
does not necessarily enable a star athlete, accomplished musician, 
political activist, or you to flourish.9 Yet each of us is a human being, and 
so my, and theirs, and your version of flourishing remain variations on 
human flourishing. Similarly, we can conceive of universal as opposed to 
culturally relative flourishing and human flourishing as opposed to non-
human animal flourishing.10   
 However, as commentators have noticed, in the Nicomachean 
Ethics there is a distinction, even a tension, between “two sorts of 
eudaimonia.” Whereas in Book 6 we encounter a practical orientation 
that aims to further eudaimonia, in Book 10 we find a theoretical 
orientation that sets forth contemplation as the model for “complete 
eudaimonia.”11 And for the latter there is a catch: according to Aristotle, 
only gods are capable of complete eudaimonia, since by their very 
nature they want for nothing. Yet human beings require, but to varying 
degrees lack, external goods – not least of which is leisure time – in order 
to devote themselves to a life of contemplation. As a result, actually 
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existing human beings in a world of relative scarcity must fall back on a 
“second-best kind of eudaimonia that consists in activity in accord with 
practical wisdom and the virtues of character.”12 I stress this tension 
between Aristotle’s two models for the good life, because, as we shall 
soon see, it occurs as well for Spinoza and Marx. It is quite true that 
“happiness for Marx, as for Aristotle, was a practical activity, not a state of 
mind.”13 
 This practical dimension of eudaimonia is at issue in Volume I of 
Marx’s Capital. Near the end of chapter one on “The Commodity,” for 
example, Marx sketches the relationship between religion and the 
historical development of economic relations in societies. As he 
concludes, 
 
The religious reflections of the real world can … vanish only when 
the practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and 
man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a 
transparent and rational form. The veil is not removed from the 
countenance of the social life-process, i.e. the process of material 
production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, 
and stands under their conscious and planned control. This, 
however, requires that society possess a material foundation, or a 
series of material conditions of existence, which in their turn are 
the natural and spontaneous product of a long and tormented 
historical development.14 
 
But what would a society of “freely associated” producers look like, and 
what would be its economic organization that resulted from “their 
conscious and planned control”? Marx offers the following thought 
experiment, which is a variation on classical economists’ use of Daniel 
Defoe’s tale of the shipwrecked Robinson Crusoe: 
 
 Let us … imagine … an association of free men, working with the 
 means of production held in common, and expending their many 
 different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single 
 social labour force. All the characteristics of Robinson’s labour are 
 repeated here, but with the difference that they are social instead 
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 of individual. All Robinson’s products were exclusively the result of 
 his own personal labour and they were therefore directly objects of 
 utility for him personally. The total product of our imagined 
 association is a social product. One part of this product serves as 
 fresh means of production and re-mains social. But another part is 
 consumed by the members of the association as means of 
 subsistence. This part must therefore be divided amongst them. 
 The way this division is made will vary with the particular kind of 
 social organization of production and the corresponding level of 
 social development attained by the producers.15 
  
We could call this passage an Aristotelian moment in Capital. Why? 
Compare these passages with one that occurs much later in chapter 
fifteen on “Machinery and Large-Scale Industry” and also involves a 
thought experiment -- this time, though, explicitly attributed to Aristotle (in 
Book I, chapter four of the Politics):16 
 
‘If,’ dreamed Aristotle, the greatest thinker of antiquity, ‘if every tool, 
when summoned, or even by intelligent anticipation, could do the 
work that befits it, just as the creations of Daedalus moved of 
themselves,17 or the tripods of Hephaestus went of their own 
accord to their sacred work,18 if the weavers’ shuttles were to 
weave of themselves, then there would be no need either of 
apprentices for the master craftsmen, or of slaves for the lords.’ … 
And Antipater, … a Greek poet of the time of Cicero, hailed the 
waterwheel for grinding corn, that most basic form of all 
productive machinery, as the liberator of female slaves and the 
restorer of the golden age … Oh those heathens! They understood 
nothing of political economy and Christianity, as the learned 
Bastiat discovered, and before him the still wiser MacCulloch.19 
They did not, for example, comprehend that machinery is the 
surest means of lengthening the working day. They may perhaps 
have excused the slavery of one person as a means to the full 
human development of another. But they lacked the specifically 
Christian qualities which would have enabled them to preach the 
slavery of the masses in order that a few crude and half-educated 
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parvenus might become ‘eminent spinners,’ ‘extensive sausage-
makers’ and ‘influential shoe-black dealers.’20 
 
What is Marx’s point in this curious passage? In the chapter on “The 
Commodity,” Marx has already commended Aristotle’s analysis of 
exchange-value (in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, chapter five) but 
noted that the latter failed to identify the “homogeneous element, i.e. the 
common substance” that is human labor.21 What historical-material 
obstruction accounted for Aristotle’s theoretical blindspot regarding 
value? As Marx puts it, Aristotle could not see that 
 
in the form of commodity-values, all labour is expressed as equal 
human labour and therefore as labour of equal quality, by 
inspection from the form of value, because Greek society was 
founded on the labour of slaves, hence had as its natural basis the 
inequality of men and of their labour-powers. The secret of the 
expression of value, namely the equality and equivalence of all 
kinds of labour because and in so far as they are human labour in 
general, could not be deciphered until the concept of human 
equality had already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular 
opinion. This however becomes possible only in a society where 
the commodity-form is the universal form of the product of labour, 
hence the dominant social relation is the relation between men as 
possessors of commodities. Aristotle’s genius is displayed 
precisely by his discovery of a relation of equality in the value-
expression of commodities. Only the historical limitation inherent in 
the society in which he lived prevented him from finding out what 
‘in reality’ this relation of equality consisted of.22 
 
David Harvey comments as follows: 
 
Of course, slavery varies a great deal in what it is about, but it is 
not about the production of value in the sense that Marx means it. 
It entails a different kind of labor process. There is no abstract 
labor in a pure slave system. This was why Aristotle could not 
formulate a labor theory of value – because this theory only works 
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in the case of free labor. Remember, value for Marx is not universal 
but specific to wage labor within a capitalist mode of production.23  
 
Or, more succinctly, in Louis Althusser’s words, “the present that enabled 
Aristotle to make this brilliant intuitive reading, simultaneously prevented 
him from solving the problem he had posed.”24   
With Marx’s critical assessment of Aristotle as an economic thinker 
in mind, we can better appreciate that in the passage cited above from 
the Politics, Aristotle falls short but in an interestingly different way: he 
poses a solution without providing a means of realizing that solution. He 
evokes a remarkable “dream of self-moving tools.” 25 And yet such a 
utopian future could scarcely be achieved under the technological 
conditions that prevailed in the ancient world. The reliance on slaves –
and free persons – to move the tools was in that epoch unavoidable. 
However, the supersession of capitalist commodity production – and its 
reliance on “enslaving” machinery in the production process – allows us 
in the twenty-first century to envision a “full automation”26 that would no 
longer require the “moral degradation” of workers and their families.27 On 
the contrary, humanity could aim at maximal leisure time through 
democratic control not just of technology but also of the larger economy. 
Indeed, such a future would be a socio-economic realization of 
eudaimonia that would go well beyond Aristotelian historical-materialist 
limits. 
Precisely such a utopian vision – arising in particular from Marx’s 
reference to the Greek poet Antipater – was to form the basis of William 
Morris’s late nineteenth-century response to Capital. Morris once 
acknowledged in his article “How I Became a Socialist” that “although I 
had thoroughly enjoyed the historical part of Capital, I suffered agonies of 
confusion of the brain over reading the pure economics of the great 
work.”28 Nonetheless, Morris’s candid admission has been identified by 
S.S. Prawer as “a welcome illustration of the way in which the quotations 
from literature introduced into Capital could bring home Marx’s 
arguments to minds that did not respond naturally or easily to economic 
formulas or statistics.”29 Morris himself noted that his  
 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 




study of history and … love and practice of art forced him into a 
hatred of the civilization which, if things were to stop as they are, 
would turn history into inconsequent nonsense, and make art a 
collection of the curiosities of the past, which would have no 
serious relation to the life of the present.30  
 
In other words, Morris maintained, he “fell into practical Socialism.”31 Such 
an orientation is abundantly clear in a lecture he first delivered in 1883 
(the year of Marx’s death) entitled “Art under Plutocracy.”32 Midway 
through his lecture, Morris contended that  
 
something must be wrong … in art, or the happiness of life is 
sickening in the house of civilization. What has caused the 
sickness? Machine-labour will you say? Well, I have seen quoted a 
passage from one of the ancient Sicilian poets rejoicing in the 
fashioning of a water-mill, and exulting in labour being set free 
from the toil of the hand-quern in consequence; and that surely 
would be a type of man's natural hope when foreseeing the 
invention of labour-saving machinery as ’tis called; natural surely, 
since though I have said that the labour of which art can form a 
part should be accompanied by pleasure, so one could deny that 
there is some necessary labour even which is not pleasant in itself, 
and plenty of unnecessary labour which is merely painful. If 
machinery had been used for minimizing such labour, the utmost 
ingenuity would scarcely have been wasted on it; but is that the 
case in any way? Look round the world, and you must agree with 
John Stuart Mill in his doubt whether all the machinery of modern 
times has lightened the daily work of one labourer. And why have 
our natural hopes been so disappointed? Surely because in these 
latter days, in which as a matter of fact machinery has been 
invented, it was by no means invented with the aim of saving the 
pain of labour. The phrase labour-saving machinery is elliptical, 
and means machinery which saves the cost of labour, not the 
labour itself, which will be expended when saved on tending other 
machines. For a doctrine which, as I have said, began to be 
accepted under the workshop-system, is now universally received, 
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even though we are yet short of the complete development of the 
system of the Factory. Briefly, the doctrine is this, that the essential 
aim of manufacture is making a profit; that it is frivolous to 
consider whether the wares when made will be of more or less 
use to the world so long as any one can be found to buy them at a 
price which, when the workman engaged in making them has 
received of necessaries and comforts as little as he can be got to 
take, will leave something over as a reward to the capitalist who 
has employed him. This doctrine of the sole aim of manufacture 
(or indeed of life) being the profit of the capitalist and the 
occupation of the workman, is held, I say, by almost every one; its 
corollary is, that labour is necessarily unlimited, and that to attempt 
to limit it is not so much foolish as wicked, whatever misery may 
be caused to the community by the manufacture and sale of the 
wares made.33 
 
Although Morris only obliquely refers here to Marx – “I have seen quoted 
a passage from one of the ancient Sicilian poets rejoicing in the 
fashioning of a water-mill, and exulting in labour being set free from the 
toil of the hand-quern in consequence” – his source is unquestionably 
chapter fifteen of Capital.  
Moreover, earlier in his lecture Morris envisions the substitution of 
association for competition “in all that relates to the production and 
exchange of the means of life” and heralds a “new birth of art, which is 
now being crushed to death by the money-bags of competitive 
commerce.”34 Since, for Morris, “art is man’s expression of his joy in 
labour,”35 only a socialist society would be able to provide the expansion 
of free time that is the prerequisite for the attainment of human 
flourishing. 
But now let us add Spinoza to the discussion to see how his 
writings help to enrich an account of the dialectically imbricated 
individual and collective aspects of human flourishing. 
In a letter sent to the Dutch jurist Hugo Boxel during the fall of 
1674, Spinoza once wrote that “the authority of Plato, Aristotle and 
Socrates carries little weight with me.”36 Spinoza’s confession occurs in 
the last of several letters exchanged with Boxel, who had initially posed 
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the question of whether or not Spinoza believed in ghosts.37 Spinoza 
continued:  
 
I should have been surprised if you had produced Epicurus, 
Democritus, Lucretius or one of the Atomists or defenders of the 
atoms. It is not surprising that those who have thought up occult 
qualities, intentional species, substantial forms and a thousand 
more bits of nonsense should have devised spectres and ghosts, 
and given credence to old wives’ tales with a view to disparaging 
the authority of Democritus, whose high reputation they so envied 
that they burned all the books which he had published amidst so 
much acclaim.38 
 
 As a result of this passage in particular, Spinoza has often been 
classified as a kind of Epicurean who rejected Aristotle.39 But this draws a 
hasty conclusion. As Alain Billecoq has observed, it is true that in this 
passage Spinoza aligns himself with a materialist “philosophical camp” 
associated with Epicurus, Democritus, and Lucretius.40 However, 
classifying philosophers into opposing idealist/materialist camps is only 
a crude first approximation for a more nuanced investigation of idealist 
and materialist tendencies that traverse all philosophical texts and 
traditions.41  
For example, following Ernst Bloch, one could well speak of an 
“Aristotelian Left”42 and seek to identify materialist elements not only in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics but also in the writings of an Islamic 
thinker like Averroes,43 whose work bears a striking affinity with Spinoza’s 
regarding both the interpretation of Scripture44 and the unity of the 
intellect.45 Indeed, it is even possible to identify in Thomas Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologiae and other texts a materialist tendency that would 
allow for a fruitful comparison of his conception of beatitudo with 
Spinoza’s.46  
Thus it appears that in his final letter to Boxel Spinoza is primarily 
trying to undercut Boxel’s appeal to authority by invoking a countervailing 
materialist “camp.” In a seventeenth-century philosophical (and scientific) 
context, this is hardly surprising.47 
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At any rate, Spinoza undoubtedly shares Epicurus’s emphasis on 
the (moderate) pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. But although 
such a perspective seems to makes sense of the third and fourth parts of 
the Ethics, it fails to do justice to part five, in which Spinoza writes about 
beatitudo, which has regularly been translated into English as 
“blessedness” (with its clearly religious connotation). However, as 
Frédéric Manzini has argued persuasively, when we track down the 
source of Spinoza’s concept of beatitudo, we find not Epicurus but 
Aristotle, and, in particular, the Nicomachean Ethics, of which Spinoza 
owned a Latin translation (since he did not read Greek).48  
Manzini has rigorously investigated how various terms were 
translated from Greek into Latin in the standard edition of Aristotle’s 
writings that Spinoza possessed in his personal library.49 For our purposes 
we can restrict ourselves to the single word in question, namely, 
eudaimonia, which we find translated into Latin as beatitudo. As a result, 
let us insist that Spinoza’s concept must not be understood as pleasure, 
satisfaction, or contentment in a subjectivist sense; rather, it must be 
understood as a variant of objective “flourishing.” Moreover, we find such 
an interpretation confirmed through an attentive reading of Spinoza’s 
Ethics.50 
For example, in the preface to the second part of the Ethics, 
Spinoza reminds his readers that he is going to discuss only those things 
that “follow from the essence of God, or the infinite and eternal being ... 
that can lead us, as if by the hand, to knowledge of the human mind and 
its greatest beatitude (ad mentis humanae, eiusque summae beatitudinis 
cognitionem).”51 Moreover, in the extended note to E2p49, Spinoza writes 
that “our greatest happiness, that is, our beatitude (nostra summa 
felicitas sive beatitudo), consists ... in the knowledge of God alone, by 
which we are led to do only those things which love and piety (amor et 
pietas) advise.” 
In E4p21 Spinoza makes the additional claim: “No one can desire 
to be blessed (beatus esse), to act well and to live well, unless at the 
same time he desires to be, to act, and to live, that is, actually to exist.” 
Here is his supporting argument: 
1. Desire is the very essence of human beings (def aff 1). 
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2. So it follows that the specific desire to live blessedly, or well, to act, 
and so on is also the very essence of human beings. 
3. But the very essence of human beings is the striving (conatus) by 
which each one of us strives to preserve his or her own being 
(E3p7). 
4. Therefore, the desire to live blessedly, to act well, and to live well, is 
the striving by which each one of us strives to preserve his or her 
being, that is, actually to exist. 
At odds with the pervasive myth that Spinoza reserved the experience of 
beatitude for an apolitical pursuit of the “intellectual love of God,” in 
E4p54 we next find him arguing that if the multitude is led by the affects 
of humility, repentance, and reverence, then it “may live from the 
guidance of reason, that is, may be free and enjoy the life of the blessed 
(beatorum vita).” Indeed, for Spinoza “the prophets” served historically as 
what we could call affective-organic intellectuals.52 
However, in the transition from part four to part five of the Ethics, 
Spinoza apparently does make a turn inward when he proposes the 
following: 
 
In life ... it is especially useful to perfect, as far as we can, our 
intellect, or reason. In this one thing consists the greatest human 
happiness, or beatitude. Indeed, beatitude is nothing but that 
serenity of mind (animi acquiescentia) that stems from intuitive 
knowledge of God. But perfecting the intellect is nothing but 
understanding God, his attributes, and his actions, which follow 
from the necessity of his nature. So the ultimate end of the human 
being who is led by reason, that is, his highest desire, by which he 
strives to moderate all the others, is that by which he or she is led 
to conceive adequately both himself and all things which can fall 
under his understanding (E4app4). 
 
But he quickly adds that the human power to moderate all desires and to 
conceive of oneself adequately is always limited, since we are “part of 
Nature” (pars naturae). Consequently, we must be satisfied by and 
remain serene in the face of, such constraint.   
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In part five Spinoza completes his earlier account of beatitudo in a 
way that certainly lends itself to a religious, even mystical or visionary, 
interpretation. For instance, we read in E5p33s that “if joy ... consists in the 
transition to a greater perfection, beatitude must surely consist in the fact 
that the mind is endowed with perfection itself” and in Ep36s that “our 
salvation, or beatitude, or freedom ... consists in a constant and eternal 
love of God, or in God’s love for human beings. And this love, or 
beatitude, is called glory in the Sacred Scriptures -- not without reason.”    
Yet there remains an important qualification of the prospect for 
beatitude that is comparable to Aristotle’s realization that in the world of 
actually existing human beings contemplation is beyond the reach of 
most, if not all, of us. Spinoza somberly admits in Ep39s that 
 
we live in continuous change ... as we change for the better or 
worse, we are called happy or unhappy. For one who has passed 
from being an infant or a child to being a corpse is called unhappy. 
On the other hand, if we pass the whole length of our life with a 
sound mind in a sound body, that is considered happiness.  
 
 Even as we continually strive to increase our body’s and mind’s 
capabilities over the course of our lives, we unavoidably fall short of 
achieving what, echoing Aristotle, we could call complete beatitude. 
Let me add in passing a few thoughts about how Spinoza’s 
conception of beatitude fits into his larger project in the Ethics. The 
conventional – and perhaps the obvious way – to read Spinoza’s Ethics is 
to begin with part one and read sequentially through to part five: in other 
words, to proceed from abstract metaphysical discussions of God, 
substance, attributes, and modes; next to infinite and finite modes in 
general and human modal existence in particular; then to passions and 
actions, servitude and freedom; and finally to arrive at the highest 
manifestations of human happiness – the intellectual love of God and 
beatitude.  
But there is a danger in this “protocol of reading”53 for the Ethics, 
namely, one of falling into what has been called acosmism, the 
philosophical position that denies the reality of the physical universe, 
which is considered to be illusory or lacking existence apart from God.54 
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Beginning with the oneness of substance, as Spinoza apparently does, 
how could we ever arrive at the diversity of singular things in the material 
world?  Finite modes might turn out to exist only in the human 
imagination. As the early modern German philosopher Salomon Maimon 
put it,  
 
In Spinoza’s system the unity is real while the diversity is merely 
ideal. In the very nature of things, while the unity which one 
observes in the order and regularity of nature, is consequently only 
coincidental; through this unity we determine our arbitrary system 
for the sake of our knowledge.It is inconceivable how one could 
turn the Spinozistic system into atheismsince these two systems 
are the exact opposite of each other. Atheism denies the existence 
of God, Spinozism denies the existence of the world. Rather, 
Spinozism should be called “acosmism.”55 
 
 But what if we were to read Spinoza’s Ethics not according to its 
order of presentation but instead according to its conceptual order? 
What if we were to carry out a materialist reversal and begin with finite 
modes, human in particular, seek what is common to all as we move 
ontologically outward, and come to appreciate how everything holds 
together as diversity in unity? Beginning with part three, we would move 
in succession to part four, part two, part one, and still wind up at part five 
– but with a new appreciation of what Spinoza means by substance and 
beatitude. Substance would then be seen as a point of arrival and not as 
a point of departure; and we would grow accustomed to calling 
metaphysics not first but last philosophy. 
Beatitude would turn out to be not the solitary experience of a 
happy few but a common good to be experienced through sharing with 
others to the greatest degree conceivable, ultimately, with all of humanity 
and the entire world. In continuity with the “Aristotelian Left,” and in 
particular with his Islamic philosophical predecessor Averroes, Spinoza 
agrees that the human intellect is not privately and exclusively held by 
individuals but opens up to the entire cosmos.56  
Based on his reading of Aristotle’s De Anima, Book III, Averroes 
argues in his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active 
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Intellect57 that the “Active Intellect conjoins with us from the outset in a 
conjunction of inexistence, I mean, the conjunction of form with the 
bearer of the form.” As a result, every human being is internally divided: 
“One part produces the intelligibles through cognition and opinion, in the 
same way as it makes something through its form into another thing.”58 At 
this early stage of his philosophical development, Averroes simply 
distinguished between the innate human capacity for thought that he 
called the receptive intellect and the transcendent activity of what he 
called the agent intellect. Later on, though, especially in his great 
commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima,59 Averroes wound up drawing an 
additional line of demarcation between the material intellect –now 
conceived as “a single, eternal, incorporeal substance”– and each 
individual’s uniquely materially constituted imaginative intellect.60  
It is not surprising and was no accident, then, that G.W. Leibniz – 
as a representative figure along with Thomas Aquinas61 of what we could 
call the “Aristotelian Right” – would later associate his contemporary 
Spinoza with a “disquieting” predecessor Averroes and condemn both as 
advocates of a philosophical position against which he recoiled, namely, 
that each individual’s specific receptive intellect is but, in Leibniz’s 
metaphor, “a drop in the ocean” of the general agent intellect.62 Indeed, 
Leibniz opens his Essais de théodicée (published in 1710)63 with a 
“Discourse on the Conformity of Reason and Faith,” and in sections seven 
and eight he attacks the “Averroists” – disparagingly called a “sect of 
philosophers” – who, by contrast, had relied on Aristotle in order to 
defend the superiority of reason over faith and bore responsibility for “the 
great schism in the West that still endures.”64 In section seven Leibniz 
seeks to reconstruct Averroes’s argument against the immortality of 
individual souls: 
 
The human species is eternal, according to Aristotle; therefore, if 
particular souls don’t perish, one must resort to the 
metempsychosis rejected by this philosopher. Or, if there are 
always new souls, one must admit the infinity of these souls 
preserved from all eternity; but actual infinity is impossible, 
according to the doctrine of the same Aristotle. Therefore, one 
must necessarily conclude that souls, that is, the forms of organic 
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bodies, must perish with these bodies, or at least this must happen 
to the passive intellect that properly belongs to each one of them. 
Thus, there will only remain the agent intellect common to all 
human beings, which Aristotle said comes from outside, and 
which must work wherever the organs are arranged; just as the 
wind produces a kind of music when it is blown into properly 
adjusted organ pipes.65 
 
In section eight Leibniz proceeds to object that “nothing could be weaker 
than this would-be proof” and insists that “it is not true that Aristotle 
refuted metempsychosis, or that he proved the eternity of the human 
kind; and after all, it is quite untrue that an actual infinity is impossible.” In 
sum, Leibniz denounces “this bad doctrine [that] is very ancient and very 
capable of dazzling the vulgar (capable d’éblouir le vulgaire).”66 
But is Averroes’s argument really as weak as Leibniz presents it? Is 
the interaction of the active and passive intellects – or their conjunction, 
to use Averroes’s term – reducible to Leibniz’s lively baroque analogy of 
“the wind produc[ing] a kind of music when it is blown into properly 
adjusted organ pipes”?67 It is doubtless true, as Peter Adamson has noted, 
that the Averroist position on the “unity of the intellect,” namely, that “all 
humans share only one intellect … sounds scarcely credible,” in his 
historical context Averroes’s “innovation was less shocking,” for “it was 
perfectly standard to posit a single agent intellect for all humankind.”68 
Averroes  
 
simply added that there is likewise only one potential or “material” 
intellect for all humankind. And this makes a certain amount of 
sense. How, after all, can a single actual intellect be paired with an 
unlimited number of potentialities (one per human)? Furthermore 
… intellection is meant to be universal. And there is only one set of 
universals to be known. Anything grasped by just one human to 
the exclusion of all others would be particular to that human, not 
universal. The unity of the intellect guarantees that when the 
teacher conveys some universal truth to a student, the teacher and 
student are literally thinking the same thing.69 
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 Anthony Kenny has proposed his own interesting argument 
regarding the Averroist position that, just as much as the agent intellect, 
the receptive material intellect “is a single, eternal, incorporeal 
substance”: 
 
Aristotle told us that the receptive intellect receives all material 
forms. But it cannot do this if in itself it possesses any material 
form. Accordingly it cannot be a body nor can it be in any way 
mixed with matter. Since it is immaterial, it must be indestructible, 
since matter is the basis of corruption, and it must be single and 
not multiple, since matter is the principle of multiplication. The 
receptive intellect is the lowest in the hierarchy of incorporeal 
intelligences, located one rung below the agent intellect. 
Paradoxically, though itself incorporeal, it is related to the 
incorporeal agent intellect in a manner similar to that in which the 
matter of a body is related to the form of a body; and so it can be 
called the material intellect.70 
 
One could immediately object to this line of reasoning that my thoughts 
cannot really be my thoughts “if they reside in a super-human intellect.” 
But, Kenny suggests, Averroes’s reply would be that “thoughts belong to 
not one, but two subjects. The eternal receptive intellect is one subject: 
the other is my imagination. Each of us possesses our own individual, 
corporeal, imagination, and it is only because of the role played in our 
thinking by this individual imagination that you and I can claim any 
thoughts as our own.”71 
Finally, Kenny argues that Averroes’s view is that “there is not … any 
personal immortality for individual humans … [and so] after death, souls 
merge with each other.”72 Kenny would have us imagine that 
 
Zaid and Amr are numerically different but identical in form. If, for 
example, the soul of Zaid were numerically different from the soul 
of Amr in the way Zaid is numerically different from Amr, the soul of 
Zaid and the soul of Amr would be numerically two, but one in 
their form, and the soul would possess another form. The 
necessary conclusion is therefore that the soul of Zaid and the soul 
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of Amr are identical in their form. An identical form inheres in a 
numerical, i.e. a divisible multiplicity, only through the multiplicity of 
matter. If then the soul does not die when the body dies, or if it 
possesses an immortal element it must, when it has left the body, 
form a numerical unity.73 
 
What, then, is beatitude for Averroes, and how may it be realized? 
Beatitude would consist of the blissful “conjunction” (Latin: coniunctio; 
Arabic: ittiṣāl) of the receptive intellect with the agent intellect.74 In this 
elevated “eudaimonic state,”75 as Averroes writes in his commentary on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics,  
 
human beings … are made like unto God in that he is all beings in 
a way and one who knows these in a way, for beings are nothing 
but his knowledge and the cause of beings is nothing but his 
knowledge. How marvelous is that order and how mysterious is 
that mode of being!76 
 
Or, to adopt a poetically charged image of lover and beloved: 
 
The active intellect, insofar as it is separate and principle for us, 
must move us in the same way as the beloved moves the lover 
and if every motion must be in contact with the thing which 
produces it as end, we must ultimately be in contact with this 
separate intellect, so that we depend on such a principle, on which 
the heaven depends, as Aristotle says, although this happens to us 
for but a short time.77 
 
Although Leibniz polemicized against what he regarded as Averroes’s 
(and Spinoza’s) conception of a mystical union of individual souls with 
the divine intellect, Charles Genequand has pointed out that what 
Averroes is arguing in this passage is simply that the highest human 
happiness 
 
resides in the intellectual apprehension of the intelligible. This is 
God’s permanent state, whereas we can only attain it for a short 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 




period because our intellect is still tied down to matter and 
potentiality. When we reach that state, however, we become like 
God in that we think ourselves, or our own essence … but this “like” 
indicates a mere comparison: there is no identification, no union.78  
 
The implication of such a perspective, however, was – and remains – at 
odds with traditional monotheistic conceptions of individual survival after 
death. As Herbert Davidson comments,  
 
When Averroes … recognizes the possibility of conjunction with the 
active intellect, whether or not he takes conjunction to be a 
complete union of the material intellect, he maintains that 
conjunction guarantees the surval of the material intellect … The 
material intellect will be void of all scientific thoughts acquired 
during the human lifetime, seeing that those thoughts are 
successive levels of abstraction, all of them ultimately rooted in 
images presented by the imaginative faculty … the state of 
conjunction with the active intellect … is not just one further level of 
abstraction, but a leap beyond. In conjunction, the material 
intellect transcends discursive science. It catapults itself beyond 
thought rooted in the impermanent images presented by the 
imaginative faculty, to a condition wherein the active intellect, an 
eternal being consisting in pure thought, is the direct object of 
thought … Obviously, no shred of anything resembling a human 
personality remains.79 
 
In a real sense, Leibniz was correct: Averroes was a scandalous 
philosopher. Moreover, the philosophical opprobrium directed against 
Averroes would later be used to stigmatize Spinoza. The dual offensive 
against Averroism-Spinozism arguably reached its zenith – or nadir – in 
the early 18th century in Pierre Bayle’s multivolume Dictionnaire historique 
et critique.80 Bayle declares in his entry on Averroes81 that the latter was 
“one of the most subtle philosophers who had appeared among the 
Arabs” and in his commentaries had “perfectly understood Aristotle’s 
thought”; nevertheless, he should be regarded as the “inventor of a 
sentiment that is quite absurd and quite contrary to Christian orthodoxy.”82 
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Bayle recoils in particular at Averroes’s “extension … and development of 
the principles of Aristotle,” namely, the “hypothesis of this philosopher” 
that “the multiplication of individuals can have foundation other than 
matter, whence it follows that the intellect is unique, since, according to 
Aristotle, it is separate and distinct from matter.” In other words, there 
exists a “unity of the intellect for all human beings.”83 Bayle also reports 
that, according to the Jesuits,  
 
[Michael] Scot84 said that Averroes was worthy of being 
excommunicated by the human species, and others say that his 
doctrine is a monster so appalling that the forests of Arabia have 
never produced one greater.85 
 
As “appalling” as Averroes’s doctrine is for Bayle, it finds its most 
“monstrous” expression in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
In his entry on Spinoza86 Bayle provides the fullest account of his 
effort to detect and combat a kind of “eternal pan-Spinozism”87 in the 
history of philosophy. Bayle begins his article by characterizing Spinoza 
as a “systematic atheist”88 whose philosophical system “is the most 
monstrous hypothesis that could be imagined, the most absurd, and the 
most diametrically opposed to the most evident notions of our mind.”89 
What is that “monstrous hypothesis”? According to Bayle, it is 
 
that there is only one substance in nature, and that this unique 
substance is endowed with an infinity of attributes -- thought and 
extension among others. In consequence of this, he asserts that all 
the bodies that exist in the universe are modifications of this 
substance in so far as it is extended, and so far as it is extended, 
and that, for example, the souls of men are modifications of this 
same substance in so far as it thinks; so that God, the necessary 
and infinitely perfect being, is indeed the cause of all things that 
exist, but he does not differ from them. There is only one being, 
and only one nature; and this nature produces in itself by an 
immanent action all that we call creatures. It is at the same time 
both agent and patient, efficient cause, and subject. It produces 
nothing that is not its own modification. There is a hypothesis that 
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surpasses all the heap of all the extravagances that can be said.90 
 
Bayle charges Spinoza with “quietism” and compares him unfavorably 
with certain Chinese sages who sought contemplative lives.91 According 
to Bayle, Chinese quietists 
 
say that all those who seek true beatitude must allow themselves 
to be so absorbed in profound meditations that they make no use 
of their intellect, but, by a complete insensibility, sink into the rest 
and inaction of the first principle, which is the true means of 
perfectly resembling it and partaking of happiness. They assert 
also that after one has reached this state of quietude, he should 
follow the ordinary course of life outwardly and teach others the 
commonly received doctrine. It is only in private and for his internal 
use that it is necessary for one to practice the contemplative 
institute of beatific inaction.92 
 
Beatific inaction: Bayle fully contributes here to fashioning a “caricature”93 
of Spinoza as a philosopher-renunciant utterly disengaged from, and 
uninterested in, worldly affairs:  
 
He felt such a strong passion to search for truth that to some 
extent be renounced the world to be better able to carry on that 
search. He was not content with having removed himself from all 
sorts of affairs; he also left Amsterdam because his friends’ visits 
interrupted his speculations too much. He retired to the country, he 
meditated there at his leisure, and he worked on microscopes and 
telescopes there. He kept up this kind of life after he settled in The 
Hague; and he gained so much pleasure from meditating, from 
putting his meditations in order, and from communicating them to 
his friends, that he allowed very little time for mental recreation; 
and sometimes he let three whole months go by without setting 
foot outside his lodgings.94 
 
Yet, as we shall see in the next section, for a reason unimagined by 
Bayle, Spinoza’s hypothesis is indeed monstrous – not for advocating 
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individual retreat and quietism but for allowing one better to understand 
the nature of political engagement and collective action. 
 
If we consider Spinoza’s philosophy in continuity with a “Left Aristotelian” 
tradition, in particular, as that tradition was inflected through “Averroism,” 
we can better appreciate Spinoza’s conception of the intellect, especially 
as presented in Part 2 of the Ethics, and its implications for politics and 
collective action. Let us focus on E2p45, in which Spinoza argues that 
whenever we form an idea of “a singular thing that actually exists,” our 
knowledge “necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God.” 
Here, in a nutshell, is Spinoza’s dense chain argument to this conclusion 
(with missing premises supplied in brackets): 
1. The idea of a singular thing that actually exists necessarily 
involves both the essence of the thing and its existence 
(E2p8c). 
2. Singular things have God for a cause insofar as God is 
considered under the attribute of which things are modes 
(E2p6). 
3. [Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived 
without God (E1p15)] 
4. Therefore, singular things cannot be conceived without God. 
5. [The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the 
knowledge of its cause (E1a4).] 
6. Therefore, the idea of each singular thing must involve the 
concept of its attribute. 
7. [God is a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance 
consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one 
expresses an eternal and infinite essence (E1d6).] 
8. Therefore, the idea of each singular thing must involve an 
eternal and infinite essence of God. 
 
Bearing in mind Spinoza’s conception of God as an “absolutely infinite 
being, that is to say, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of 
which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence,” we can 
grasp the radicality of this argument for the purpose of understanding 
collective action. We can discern here in Spinoza’s metaphysics of 
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mental nonlocality95 the operation of what Roberto Esposito has called 
“the principle of the impersonality of thought” – a profoundly subversive 
principle that  
 
calls into question … the set of exclusionary thresholds that cut the 
human race into overlapping segments based on the amount of 
reason attributed to them – starting from the unbreakable line that 
seprates the bearers of thought from those who are incapable of 
true speculative activity and therefore subjected to the control of 
those who are. To see intelligence not as a property of the few, to 
the detriment of others, but as a resource for all, through which 
one can pass without appropriating it for oneself, means to assign 
it a collective power that only the human species as a whole can 
fully actualize.96 
 
Let us consider, then, a historical conjuncture to be a singular thing in 
Spinoza’s sense. What Spinoza is arguing in E2p45 is that whenever one 
forms an idea of a given conjuncture, then one’s finite individual intellect 
opens up to an infinite collective intellect as we undergo a transition from 
an understanding of the world sub specie durationis to an understanding 
of the world sub specie aeternitas.97 As Spinoza adds in a note to the 
proposition: 
 
By existence here I do not understand duration, that is, existence 
insofar as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain species of 
quantity. For I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is 
attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow 
from the eternal necessity of God’s nature in infinitely many modes 
… I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things 
insofar as they are in God. For even if each one is determined by 
another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force (vis) 
by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal 
necessity of God’s nature.98 
 
If human beings are to transform social structures and institutions 
effectively and lastingly, then they must go beyond conceiving them 
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abstractly and isolated from one another; instead, they must grasp how 
these structures and institutions fit concretely into a larger scheme 
(whether it is called “divine” or “natural” is moot, for these descriptions are 
functionally equivalent in Spinoza’s metaphysics). Indeed, this realization 
allows for the demarcation of an eternal dimension to political struggle 
that is not limited to merely episodic skirmishes. For if capitalism is 
indeed inextricably embedded in “the web of life,”99 then in order to 
overturn capitalism one must be able to step back and comprehend it 
from the “perspective of eternity” and thereby orient anti-capitalist 
strategy that could lead to a new mode of production under – as Marx 
put it in Capital – the “conscious and planned control” of  “freely 
associated” men and women.100 Let us call the anticipatory experience of 
this eternal dimension of political struggle by its Spinozist name, 
beatitude, for it points beyond the present conjuncture to how one day 
society could be reorganized in the common interest of all humanity, 
once the “capitalist integument” binding production and dominating 
labor has at last been “burst asunder” and “the knell of capitalist private 
property [has] sound[ed].”101  
 In sum, as Robert Misrahi has observed, for Spinoza “beatitude is 
not a mystical experience but a human and existential plenitude … it is 
the highest moment of a humanist ethics of freedom and joy.” As a result, 
“far from being elitist, the ethics of beatitude is, on the contrary, a 
universalist doctrine … simultaneously concerned about happiness and 
democracy.”102  Unfortunately, though, we continue to live in societies that 
are far from democratic and not particularly happy. Thus returns the 
demand for real happiness. 
 Interestingly, this demand has recently been made by a number of 
environmental theorists who have contended that the much used, and 
regularly abused, term “sustainability” needs to be rethought.103 Since we 
are not – to use Spinoza’s language – imperia in imperio, or “states within 
states,” our flourishing depends on the flourishing not only of other 
human beings but also of other forms of life on this planet. As Edward 
McCord puts it,104 we must seek “attributes of character that optimize a 
flourishing life”: 
Focusing on your personal fulfillment in a flourishing life provides a 
more accurate perspective on your ‘rational self-interest.’ The 
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values that you favor are not measured only by the commodities 
you buy with money but more fundamentally by the qualities of 
character that you allow to influence what you buy. In other words, 
to gain a true sense of your values, it would be misleading to focus 
only on the specific things you choose to do, for those choices 
may emanate from traits of your character than you would rather 
not have. 
 Aristotle’s civilization was different from ours, and it 
flourished a long time ago, but a striking measure of his timeless 
insight is that the evaluation of qualities of character remains 
pervasive and fundamental in our reflections about ourselves and 
one another. Such evaluation is readily prompted by our attitudes 
about other species.105 
 
John Ehrenfeld has also offered a striking definition of ecological 
sustainability: ‘the possibility that human and other life will flourish on this 
planet forever’.106 One could quibble with Ehrenfeld’s choice of words: to 
flourish forever is presumably not within our means. But to flourish 
eternally, that is, to consider sustainability as flourishing “from the 
perspective of eternity,”107 is an entirely different matter. Not only is this 
possible, it is necessary if we are to contest the ideological appropriation 
of “sustainability.”108  
In chapter twenty-three of Capital Marx makes the following keen 
observation: “The Roman slave was held by chains; the wage-labourer is 
bound to his owner by invisible threads. The appearance of 
independence is maintained by a constant change in the person of the 
employer, and by the legal fiction of a contract.”109 If philosophy has any 
contemporary value for Marxism, it must be to make visible and help to 
sever the invisible threads of capitalist exploitation, to serve the cause of 
an independent working class movement, and to plead the case for a 
truly sustainable economic system. But we need something more in the 
fierce urgency of the present conjuncture.110 
We need a new materialist beatific vision, or what L. A. Paul has 
called a “transformative experience,”111 which would motivate our actions 
today for a future about which we cannot be certain. If we were to 
succumb to the grim perspective that this is the last generation,112 then we 
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would indeed have reason for despair that there is no point in struggling 
to change the world. But if, on the other hand, as Naomi Klein has aptly 
put it, the climate crisis “changes everything”;113 then we should act 
accordingly. In the spirit of previous freedom movements, we must take 
up a “fight for each other,”114 restrain the worst features of the 
“Anthropocene,”115 and thereby avoid collapse into the “Eremocene,” or 
“Age of Loneliness” in which “all that remains of global biodiversity is 
people … our domesticated plants and animals, and our croplands all 
around the world as far as the eye can see.”116 Beyond this, we must 
urgently build the fossil-fuel-free world that is a precondition for collective 
flourishing -- for what Marx called real happiness.  
Yet, as Leif Wenar cautions, the scope and difficulty of this struggle 
is historically unprecedented. For example, although it resembles the 
abolitionist cause,  
 
breaking the world’s slave chains was a moral triumph; breaking 
the world’s supply chains is not an option. Fighting these new 
crises means disciplining the creations of which we are so proud. 
Climate change is a crisis of invention. So many more humans, 
living longer, eating better, traveling more to see the world and 
each other -- how poignant to see that all of this avalanches into a 
mortal threat. 
 
As a result, Wenar insists, “both self-control and ingenuity will be needed 
to limit the threats that rise with our success.”117 Let us expand on Wenar’s 
two requirements in reverse order. “Ingenuity” would seem to be a matter 
especially of technology, which as Marx insightfully wrote in a footnote in 
Capital, “reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct process of 
the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of the 
production of the social relations of his life, and of the mental 
conceptions that flow from those relations.”118  
 “Self-control,” however, has to do with how human beings adjust 
the “mental relations” that arise from a given socio-historical level of 
technology; it returns us to the realm of ethics in the precise sense that, 
following Gilles Deleuze’s formulation, we should aspire to “to do all we 
can”119 -- this time by endeavoring to flourish within the contours set by 
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what Earth System scientists have called “planetary boundaries.”120 In a 
word: there can be no beatitude without fortitude, but there is no need for 
fortitude apart from the struggle for a better world.121 
As a final point of orientation, let us note that in his Theological-
Political Treatise Spinoza interprets Jesus’s122 second beatitude “Blessed 
are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted” (Mt 5.4) by suggesting 
that “those who mourn” refers only to “those who mourn that the 
kingdom of God and justice are neglected by human beings; for only 
those can mourn this who love nothing but the kingdom of God and 
justice, and wholly despise all fortune besides.”123 According to Spinoza, 
Jesus was not, however, “laying down ordinances as a legislator” but 
was “offering doctrine as a teacher,”124 as a kind of people’s philosopher 
who “understood revealed things truly and adequately.”125 Spinoza even 
ventures that Jesus spoke “to people who were oppressed and living in a 
corrupt state where justice was completely neglected, and he saw that 
the ruin of that state was imminent.”126  
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economy at University College London in 1828. Both Bastiat and McCulloch were 
leading figures of what Marx sarcastically called “vulgar political economy.” 
20 Marx 1990, pp. 531-33. 
21 Marx 1990, p. 151. 
22 Marx 1990, p. 152. 
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23 Harvey 2010, p. 127. 
24 Althusser et al. 2015, p. 272. 
25 Wending 2011, p. 25. 
26 Srnicek and Williams 2016. 
27 On the moral degradation especially resulting from machine production, see Marx, pp. 
517-26. 
28 Morris 1979, p. 241. 
29 Prawer 1978, p. 334. 
30 Morris 1979, p. 244. 
31 Morris 1979, p. 242. Emphasis in the original. 
32 Morris 1979, pp. 57-85. 
33 Morris 1979, pp. 72-73. For a discussion of Morris’s socialist critique of the capitalist use 
of machinery, see Thompson 2011, pp. 649-54. 
34 Morris 1979, p. 66. 
35 Morris 1979, p. 67.  
36 Letter 56. Translations from Spinoza’s letters are based on Samuel Shirley’s in Spinoza 
1995. For an excellent commentary on the broader philosophical implications of the 
Spinoza-Boxel correspondence, see Billecoq 1986. 
37 Letter 51. 
38 Letter 56. 
39 This common claim fails to account for Spinoza’s positive references to the Aristotelian 
view of human beings as “social animals” (see Ep35s and TP 2.15) and does not 
acknowledge the epistemological and metaphysical debt Spinoza owes to Aristotle. 
Manzini 2009 is invaluable for having made the extent of this debt explicit. 
40 Billecoq 1987, pp. 95-7. Billecoq borrows the term ‘philosophical camp’ from the 
Marxist philosopher Lucien Sève; see Sève 1980, pp. 258-61.  
41 For more on the history of philosophy as a struggle of tendencies, see Stolze 2015. 
42 Bloch 1972, pp. 479-546. Bloch includes Spinoza’s “philosophy of immanence” as 
continuous with the “Aristotelian Left” (pp. 511-2), and he suggests that the argument of 
Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise falls within this tradition’s varied attempts to 
reduce religion to morality (p. 515). 
43 I retain the Latinized name of the twelfth-century jurist-philosopher Abū al-Walīd 
Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Rushd to emphasize the “universalizable nature” of his 
thought (Ricard 2015, p. 115) and his vital influence on the reception of Aristotle in the 
Thirteenth-Century European philosophical conjuncture that was structured in terms of 
three secondary tendencies regarding (a) the eternity of the world, (b) the unity of the 
intellect, and (c) the relationship between faith and reason. For a superb analysis of the 
sharply opposed positions taken by various Christian thinkers regarding these 
tendencies, see van Steenberghen 1980. 
44 On Averroes’s approach to reading the Qur’an, see his Decisive Treatise (Averroes 
1976) and, in commentary, Ricard 2015. On a possible dialogue between Spinoza and 
Islamic philosophy, see Djedi 2010; and for specifically Averroistic sources of Spinoza’s 
thinking about religion and philosophy, see Fraenkel 2011; 2012, pp. 202-12; 2013. 
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45 As we shall see below, Averroes’s distinctive conception of the intellect arose from his 
radical interpretation of Aristotle’s De Anima (Aristotle 1987). 
46 Briefly, for Aquinas beatitude is the highest form of human happiness; however, unlike 
for Spinoza, beatitude is transcendent and only fully achievable after one’s death, since 
it requires union with God. Moreover, Aquinas’s conception of beatitude lacks a 
collective dimension to be found in Spinoza’s writings. For Aquinas’s conception of 
beatitude, see Davies 2014, pp. 154-8. For a persuasive attempt to reconstruct and 
reclaim Aquinas’s own qualified “materialism,” see Turner 2013, pp. 47-69.  
47 On the widespread strategic use of Epicurean materialism to bypass or undercut 
Scholastic appeals to “the Philosopher” (as Aquinas called Aristotle), see especially 
Jones 1992 and Wootton 2015. 
48 Manzini 2009, pp. 9-15. 
49 A 1548 edition of Aristotle’s Omnia Opera published in Basel, which reprinted a 1542 
edition. 
50 All translations from Spinoza’s Ethics are based on Edwin Curley’s in Spinoza 1996. For 
a somewhat different reconstructions of Spinoza’s conception of beatitude, which do 
not draw out its political implications as I do here, see Manzini 2014 and Ramond 2016, 
pp. 205-221. 
51 Spinoza 1996, p. 67, translation slightly modified. 
52 See my discussion of prophets and the multitude in Stolze 2009, pp. 156-59. 
53 To borrow Althusser’s terminology from Reading Capital; see Althusser et al. 2015, p. 
218. 
54 On the charge of “acosmism” leveled against Spinoza by Maimon and Hegel, see 
Melamed 2010. 
55 Translated by and quoted in Melamed 2010, p. 79. 
56 In a remarkable book Augusto Illuminati has linked Marx to Averroes regarding the 
concept of a “public” or “general intellect”; see Illuminati 1996. Robert Esposito has also 
proposed that Averroes sets into motion a “philosophy of the impersonal” that “entails a 
dislocation of the ‘place’ of thought” -- in other words has a “tendency to externalize 
thought with respect to the interiority of consciousness” (Esposito 2015, pp. 9-10). 
Esposito fashions his own lineage of philosophers who have historically destabilized the 
coincidence of external, objective thought and subjective, internal consciousness: after 
Averroes, Bruno and Spinoza, and leading up to such modern figures as Schelling, 
Nietzsche, Bergson, and Deleuze (pp. 143-202). 
57 Averroes 1982. 
58 Averroes 1982, p. 45. 
59 Averroes 2009. 
60 See Davidson 1992, pp. 220-356 for an unrivaled account of Averroes’s philosophical 
development regarding the intellect. 
61 The two polemical works by Thomas Aquinas that explicitly address, encroach on, and 
seek to counteract the Averroist materialist threat through an idealist rereading of 
Aristotle are De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas (On the Unity of the Intellect 
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against the Averroists, 1270) and De aeternitate mundi (On the Eternity of the World, 
1271); see Aquinas 1993; 1998, pp. 710-17. 
62 See Brenet 2015, p. 115n. 22. Leibniz’s key text at stake here is his 1702 essay 
“Considérations sur la doctrine d’un esprit universel unique” (Considerations on the 
Doctrine of a Unique Universal Mind); see Leibniz 1994, pp. 217-32; Leibniz 1989, pp. 
554-60. 
63 Leibniz 1969; see the somewhat dated English translation available in Leibniz 1985. 
64 Leibniz 1969, p. 54. 
65 Leibniz 1969, p. 55. 
66 Leibniz 1969, p. 55. 
67 Leibniz tries out the core analogy of wind / agent intellect : : organ pipes / receptive 
intellect in his earlier unpublished 1702 “Considerations on the Doctrine of a Unique 
Universal Mind”: “just as the same breath of wind causes various pipes of an organ to 
sound differently” (comme un même soufflé de vent fait sonner différemment divers 
tuyaux d’orgue); see Leibniz 1994, p. 219. It is worth noting that a decade later Leibniz 
has modified the analogy by qualifying the organ pipes as ones that have been 
“properly adjusted” (bien ajustés). At any rate, Leibniz’s analogy fails to do justice to 
Averroes’s threefold distinction of agent, receptive, and imaginative intellects. 
68 Adamson 2015, p. 88. See Davidson 1992 for an unrivalled account of how the agent 
intellect operated as a contested concept from Aristotle, through late-Greek antiquity, to 
the rise of Arabic philosophy and such key figures as Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. 
69 Adamson 2015, pp. 88-89. 
70 Kenny 2005, p. 230 
71 Kenny 2005, p. 230. 
72 Kenny 2005, p. 231. 
73 Kenny 2005, p. 231. 
74 For an overview of Averroes’s conception of beatitude and “its echoes in the Latin 
West,” see Spruit 2013. Esposito notes that for Averroes, as for Spinoza, beatitude 
“consists of a process of deindividuation or desubjectification, which reassembles the 
unity of being beyond our imagination” (Esposito 2015, p. 165). 
75 Davidson 1992, p. 4. 
76 Averroes 1984, p. 399. 
77 Averroes 1984, p. 157. 
78 Averroes 1984, p. 51. 
79 Davidson 1992, pp. 337-8. 
80 Bayle 1740. 
81 Bayle 1740, vol. 1, pp. 384-91. 
82 Bayle 1740, vol. 1, pp. 384-5. 
83 Bayle 1740, vol. 1, p. 385, Remark E. 
84 Scot (1175 – c.1232) was a noted translator from Arabic into Latin of Averroes’s 
commentaries on two works by Aristotle: De anima (On the Soul) and De caelo (On the 
Heavens). 
85 Bayle 1740, vol. 1, p. 386, Remark E. 
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86 Bayle 1740, vol. 4, pp. 253-71; Bayle 1965, pp. 288-338. 
87 I borrow this term from Charles-Daubert and Moreau in their introduction to Bayle 
1983, p. 10. The term designates for Bayle precisely what in chapter one above we 
called a philosophical (secondary) tendency. It connotes a danger not just in the 
Western world (from such ancient thinkers as Xenophon to medieval European 
pantheists like David of Dinant and Giordano Bruno); rather, Bayle sees evidence it in 
India, China, and Japan as well. 
88 Bayle 1740, vol. 4, p. 253; Bayle 1965, p. 288. It is true that in his “clarification concerning 
atheists” (Bayle 1740, vol. 4, pp. 627-9; Bayle 1965, pp. 399-408) Bayle allows for the 
possibility of “virtuous” atheists like Epicurus (Bayle 1740, vol. 4, p. 627; Bayle 1965, p. 
401) and Spinoza (Bayle 1740, vol. 4, p. 629; Bayle 1965, p. 405). What it might mean to 
call Spinoza an “atheist” and whether or not it correctly describes Spinoza’s actual view 
of the interrelationship of God, religious belief and practice, and morality is carefully 
examined in Rosenthal 2012 and Billecoq 2016. 
89 Bayle 1740, vol. 4, p. 259; Bayle 1965, pp. 296-7. 
90 Bayle 1740, vol. 4, p. 259, Remark N; Bayle 1965, pp. 300-1, Remark N. 
91 Bayle 1740, vol. 4, pp. 254-5, Remark B; Bayle 1965, pp. 288-93, Remark B.  
92 Bayle 1740, vol. 4, p. 255; Bayle 1965, p. 291 (translation slightly modified). 
93 Moreau 2003, p. 110. This caricature extends as well to Bayle’s confusion of Spinoza’s 
concepts of “naturing Nature” (natura naturans) and “natured Nature” (natura naturata). 
As a result, as Pierre-François Moreau puts it, for Bayle “Spinozism appears as a 
gigantic fusion of God with the world, which makes contradictions in the world 
incomprehensible … the thought of one substance suppresses transcendence and 
illustrates the contradictions of a reason left to its own excesses without the restraint of 
dogma” (Moreau 2003, p. 110). More recently, Carolyn Merchant (2016, pp. 101-24) has 
also mistakenly equated natura naturans and natura naturata in Spinoza’s thought and 
argued that the latter regarded the world as exhaustively describable in terms of 
physical laws. Yet this distinction marks an internal division within substance (“God”) 
and signifies the infinite causal productivity of substance over its diverse modal effects. 
Since human beings, according to Spinoza, in fact perceive only two attributes of 
substance -- mind and extension -- they cannot in principle arrive at a complete 
account of the world (as it exists in itself with an infinity of attributes) prior to, and 
independent of, the operation of the intellect. 
94 Bayle 1740, vol. 4, pp. 256-7; Bayle 1965, p. 294. 
95 At the risk of historico-scientific anachronism, I use the term “nonlocality” (drawn from 
quantum mechanics) to register that for Spinoza the intellect is not separate from the 
body; rather, the embodied mind is “out of place”: it is simultaneously located (as well as 
dislocated and relocated) at two different ontological levels: (a) among modes and (b) 
between finite modes and absolutely infinite substance. 
96 Esposito 2015, p. 12. Esposito points out, however, that “there is an important point 
which clearly differentiates the definition of thought in Spinoza from both the possible 
intellect and, all the more so, from the agent intellect that Averroes talks about, in part 
due to the lack of difference between potency and act: this is its separate dimension, at 
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the heart of Averroes’s theory. That thought is impersonal and does not belong to 
anyone, as both philosophers maintain, does not mean that it is necessarily separate” 
(Esposito 2015, p. 165). Esposito attributes Spinoza’s “leap forward” from Averroes’s 
“radical Aristotelianism” to the latter’s effort to “deconstruct the Christian or Platonic 
composite of mind and soul” (p. 166), whereas the former seeks to “deconstruct” both 
the Cartesian duality between mind and body and the Hobbesian materialist reduction 
of mind to body. For Spinoza, as Esposito puts it, “not only can a mind not exist outside 
the body, the body is actually the content of the mind” (p. 165). 
97 Esposito rightly points out, however, that Averroes’s conception of a common active 
intellect that is external to individual imaginative intellect remains anthropocentric in a 
way that Bruno and Spinoza will later reject (Esposito 2015, pp. 155, 165). 
98 E2p45s. 
99 Moore 2015. 
100 Marx 1990, p. 173. 
101 Marx 1990, p. 929. 
102 Misrahi 2005, pp. 89-90. 
103 The best critical introduction to the history and contemporary usage of the term 
“sustainability” is Jacques 2015. 
104 McCord 2012. 
105 McCord 2012, pp. 119-20. 
106 Ehrenfeld 2008, p. 6, emphasis removed. 
107 See E2p44c2, d; E5p29. 
108 See Parr 2009 and Rogers 2013. 
109 Marx 1990, p. 719. 
110 Here I am deliberately mixing the language of Marxism and of Martin Luther King, Jr., 
who famously spoke in his 1963 “I Have a Dream” speech about the “fierce urgency of 
now” (see Younge 2013, p. xii.). 
111 Paul 2014. 
112 See Smith 2015 for the moral implications of this unsettling thought experiment 
devised by the philosopher Samuel Scheffler and developed in Scheffler 2013. 
113 Klein 2014. 
114 To adopt Wen Stephenson’s formulation. Stephenson has especially well invoked the 
Abolitionist movement as a way to orient the next steps of the climate justice 
movement; see Stephenson 2015, especially pp. 23-45.  
115 As Ian Angus has compellingly argued (Angus 2016), although it is not possible to 
reverse the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch, it is both technologically feasible 
and morally imperative to transcend capitalism by constructing an ecosocialist 
alternative that would allow humanity and other species to remain within the planetary 
boundaries that provide a safe operating space for us and them. 
116 Wilson 2016, p. 20. 
117 Wenar 2016, p. 339. 
118 Marx 1990, p. 493. David Harvey has fully explored the multiple implications of Marx’s 
footnote; see especially Harvey 2010, pp. 189-212. 
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119 Deleuze 1990a, pp. 268-9.  
120 For an overview of the science of planetary boundaries, see Angus 2016, pp. 59-77. 
121 For Spinoza’s concept of “fortitude” and its application to an “ethics for Marxism,” see 
Stolze 2014. 
122 Spinoza standardly uses in Latin not the personal name Iesus but instead the title 
Christus (“Annointed One” or “Messiah”).  
123 TTP 7.7. 
124 TTP 7.7. 
125 TTP 4.10. 
126 TTP 7.7. 
127 To be more precise: although the Latin Vulgate from which Spinoza quotes uses the 
plural beati, the underlying Greek text of the Gospel of Matthew has makarioi, which 
means the “blessed,” but with a distinctive religious and passive nuance that 
eudaimonia lacks. Yet when Jesus singles out peasants and artisans for “blessing” and 
not socio-economic-religious elites, he upends passivity by inviting the “ordinary people” 
(generally maligned by Aristotle) to participate in a transformational movement for the 
renewal of Israel and to pursue an egalitarian kingdom of God that would be the 
antithesis of the existing Roman imperial order. At any rate, Spinoza clearly expresses 
here his sympathy for Jesus’s radical “doctrine.” 
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